United Nations S/AC.49/2017/74

Security Council

Distr.: General
22 June 2017

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 19 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to enclose herewith the report of the Government of Georgia on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016) (see annex).

17-10778 (E) 070717

Please recycle

Annex to the note verbale dated 19 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Georgia on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016)

General information

In 2011, the Government of Georgia issued a decree on the establishment of the Intergovernmental Commission on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. The Commission is chaired by the Secretary of the State Security and Crisis Management Council of Georgia.

In order to fully comply with the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council in its resolutions, the Commission is authorized to restrict the issuance of permits for the import, export, re-export, transit and temporary importation and/or exportation of the products subject to export and import controls.

The Commission and its working group are entitled to:

(a) Appear in court with a view to seizing the property of persons specified in the Security Council resolutions;

(b) In accordance with the Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the appeals made on reasonable grounds by relevant foreign or national authorities, compile a list of persons associated with terrorist activities and address the court for the seizure of the property thereof;

(c) Address the court in order to release seized property in the event that the owner thereof is removed from the sanctions list and/or is no longer associated with terrorist activities;

(d) Apply to the relevant state institutions with the demand that Georgian visas not be issued to persons on the sanctions list and that such persons not be admitted to the territory of Georgia;

(e) Monitor the implementation of the restrictive procedures imposed.

Procedure for the freezing of property

The procedure for freezing the property of physical and legal persons is regulated by the Administrative Procedure Code of Georgia.

The secretariat of the Commission updates the list of designated individuals and legal entities on a daily basis, on the basis of the information (listing and delisting) published on the website of the sanctions committees. The Commission sends a motion to the Administrative Chamber of Tbilisi City Court in order to freeze the assets of the individuals and legal entities designated by the Security Council in its resolutions.

In accordance with recent amendments, the court will review the motion of the secretariat of the Commission without delay and without an oral hearing (art. 2132, para. 1, of the Administrative Procedure Code). The motion submitted to the court does not need further consideration. The judge does not require further argumentation from the Commission. The court issues order(s) on freezing measures and sends one copy to the Commission to be submitted to the National Bureau of Enforcement, which is responsible for implementing the court decisions on the

freezing of the financial assets of designated persons. The Bureau lists all persons included in the court order in the Debtor Register.

Supervisory and monitoring mechanisms

The Debtor Register is a means applied prior to the enforcement of a fiscal suit. It is a systematized electronic database of individuals, legal entities and organizations, indicating the enforcement administration applied thereto since 1 January 2010. A person is registered in the Debtor Register the moment he or she becomes the target of an enforcement proceeding. The Debtor Register is available to the public and accessible from the Bureau website (https://debt.reestri.gov.ge/main.php?s=1).

Given that the data of the Register is public, the Bureau ensures that it is available (accessible) to State-registered agencies, banks and other institutions (including monitoring entities). Supervisory authorities and monitoring entities systematically check debtor lists and receive updates on designated persons.

Implementation of the sanctions regime imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

In order to implement the sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), relevant agencies are officially notified of any additional sanctions imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (resolution 2321 (2016)), including:

(a) Prohibiting the procurement of copper, nickel, silver and zinc, as well as vessels and aircraft;

(b) Reducing the number of staff at the diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Democratic People's Democratic Republic of Korea;

(c) Limiting the number of bank accounts to one per diplomatic mission and consular post of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and one per accredited diplomat and consular officer of that country;

(d) Taking necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or bank accounts in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Government also notes that neither Georgia nor the Democratic People's Republic of Korea maintain diplomatic missions or consular services on each others' territory and that no working, official or diplomatic visits are carried out between Georgia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

To remain in compliance with the Security Council resolutions, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the Law on the "Control of Military and Dual-use Goods". New legislation and military and dual-use goods lists (which are identical to the relevant laws and lists of the European Union) have enabled the Government to control the export, import, transit and brokering of and technology support for military and dual-use goods on the basis of modern European standards.

Over recent years, no permit has been issued for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the export, import or transit of the products specified in the list of military and dual-use products and provided for in the Law on the "Control of Military and Dual-use Goods".

The Commission applied to the Administrative Chamber of Tbilisi City Court to freeze the assets of individuals and legal entities of the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (overall, 39 individuals and 42 legal entities), in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

All citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea need a visa to enter the territory of Georgia irrespective of the kind of passport held. In the past year, six citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea visited Georgia, but none of them were listed in the sanctions list. Each visitor was scrutinized against electronic databases at the border checkpoint. By the end of 2017, the Government plans to launch advance passenger information and passenger name record systems.

In addition, the list of all Ocean Maritime Management vessels, which represent an "economic resource" of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and are subject to seizure pursuant to Security Council resolution 2270 (2016), has been disseminated to the relevant target agencies.

United Nations S/AC.49/2017/75

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2017

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 20 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to transmit its report on the measures taken by the Government of Brazil regarding the implementation of resolution 2321 (2016) (see annex).

17-10832 (E) 060717

Please recycle

Annex to the note verbale dated 20 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Brazil on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016)

1. Further to its previous reports (S/AC.49/2006/35, S/AC.49/2009/40, S/AC.49/2010/7, S/AC.49/2013/2 and S/AC.49/2016/63) submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), the Government of Brazil has the honour to inform the Committee as to the concrete measures it has taken with a view to effectively implementing the relevant provisions of resolution 2321 (2016) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

2. By means of Presidential Decree No. 9,033 of 19 April 2017, resolution 2321 (2016) was incorporated into Brazilian law and the implementation thereof made mandatory for all Brazilian authorities and for all individuals and entities under its jurisdiction.[1]

3. The Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations would like to recall that the additional sanctions adopted under resolution 2321 (2016) will be applied within an already consolidated set of laws and practices carried out by Brazilian authorities concerning the Security Council-mandated sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

4. As stated in the previous report (S/AC.49/2016/63) with regard to the arms embargo and non-proliferation measures outlined in the sanctions regime, the legal and institutional framework referred to in paragraphs 3 to 11 of the report submitted by Brazil in 2010 (S/AC.49/2010/7) is suitable for the implementation of any additional sanctions. With respect to the sectoral trade bans on coal, minerals and fuel, as well as the new items added to the luxury goods ban, the Department of Federal Revenue of the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Federal Police of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, in cooperation with the Armed Forces, have the powers to enforce the provisions of the relevant sanctions and combat the smuggling of prohibited goods, as detailed in paragraph 2 of the 2010 report.

5. In regard to the financial sector, the legal framework to implement the sanctions regime was explained in detail in paragraph 4 of the report submitted by Brazil in 2016 (S/AC.49/2016/63). The Brazilian judiciary has issued three precautionary measures, most recently on 27 April 2017, accepting the Government's advance request to freeze all assets, rights or values of the individuals and entities designated under United Nations resolutions on sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the time of writing, however, no assets, rights or values of the aforementioned individuals or entities had been found in Brazil.

6. With regard to the measures set out in paragraphs 14 to 18 of resolution 2321 (2016), Decree No. 9,033 of 2017 allows Brazilian authorities to fully apply the measures against prohibited activities by diplomatic personnel. Should other measures be needed, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, in particular, articles 9, 11, 12, 41, 42 and 43, provides additional means to effectively apply any of the sanctions.

[1] The full text of the decree, in Portuguese, is on file with the Secretariat and available for consultation.

7. The following competent authorities were duly informed about the strengthening of the sanctions regime under resolution 2321 (2016), having been specifically informed of the respective issues to consider and the measures to implement in order to prevent any violations:

(a) Financial measures: the Central Bank of Brazil, the Brazilian Development Bank, the Council for Financial Activities Control, the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Federal Revenue;

(b) Measures concerning the movement of persons: the immigration division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Federal Police;

(c) Measures concerning the movement of goods and the transfer of technical training, advice, services or assistance: the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, the Department of Federal Revenue and the Brazilian Machinery Builders' Association;

(d) Restrictions on maritime and air transport: the National Civil Aviation Agency, the National Agency for Land Transportation and the National Agency for Water Transportation;

(e) Restrictions on the diplomatic and consular offices of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: the diplomatic privileges and immunity division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

8. In addition to its efforts to effectively implement the provisions of resolution 2321 (2016) and all previous Security Council resolutions concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Brazilian Government has publicly and strongly condemned the nuclear and ballistic missile tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of Council resolutions. Brazil has also expressly associated itself with the condemnations issued by the Council.

9. In 2017, three press releases were issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning missile tests.[2]

10. No prohibited activities had been identified at the time of writing. Regarding some import operations of iron and steel articles, which were the object of consultation by the Panel of Experts, Brazil clarified that the issue resulted from an error by the importers in filling out the appropriate forms, since the imports did not actually originate in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The relevant authorities in the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services are working to gather additional information and documents requested by the Panel of Experts.

11. Brazil reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of all Security Council resolutions concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016). In this context, it reaffirms the importance of implementing the provisions of those resolutions without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, except those established pursuant to resolution 2321 (2016).

[2] The full text of the press releases is on file with the Secretariat and available for consultation.

United Nations S/AC.49/2017/76

Security Council

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28 June 2017
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Original: Spanish

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 27 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to transmit herewith the report on measures taken by the Government of Peru to implement Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) (see annex).

17-10837 (E) 050717 060717

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Annex to the note verbale dated 27 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Peru on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016)

Introduction

Peru is a nation committed to United Nations efforts to strengthen international peace and security. In that connection, it recognizes the Security Council's authority to impose measures in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Peru, a country with a long tradition of promoting disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, advocates a process of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and is a party to all related international regimes, which are its highest foreign policy priority. Peru is a party to the following international instruments, among others:

- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted on 1 July 1968, ratified by Peru on 3 March 1970 and in force in Peru since 5 March 1970.
- Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), adopted on 14 February 1967 and in force in Peru since 4 March 1969.
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, instrument of ratification deposited on 29 May 2009.
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted by Legislative Decision No. 26376 of 28 October 1994 and in force in Peru since 10 February 1995.
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, signed by the Government of Peru on 25 September 1996 and adopted by the National Congress at its session on 25 September 1997. The instrument of ratification was deposited on 12 November 1997. Not in force.
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, instrument of ratification deposited on 20 July 1995.
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, instrument of ratification deposited on 5 June 1985.
- Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, instrument of accession deposited on 21 May 1985.

Peru is committed to implementation of the Security Council resolutions and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and to abandon all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes.

In that regard, the Government of Peru has condemned the nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because it believes that they seriously threaten international peace and security and

flagrantly violate that country's international disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, including under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Peru hopes for an early resumption of the six-party talks in order to reach a negotiated political solution on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Measures to implement Security Council resolution 2321 (2016)

Pursuant to Supreme Decree No. 016-2007-RE on the publication of Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Ministerial Decision No. 0009/2017-RE provided for the publication in the official gazette *El Peruano* of the substantive summary of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) on the non-proliferation of weapons and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Publication of the summary represents completion of the domestic legal procedures for ensuring that these sanctions are implemented by all government sectors and agencies.

Asset-freeze measures

Legal framework

To ensure implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and to improve domestic regulations in effect, on 13 July 2016 the Superintendency of Banks, Insurance and Private Pension Fund Administrators adopted Decision No. 3862-2016, which regulates the mechanisms and procedures permitting the Financial Intelligence Unit of Peru to freeze administratively the funds or other assets of individuals or entities associated with terrorism or its financing, and those of individuals or entities associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing, identified pursuant to Security Council resolutions, with special reference to the resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including their follow-up resolutions (see paragraph 3 of resolution 2321 (2016)).

In that regard, the Financial Intelligence Unit has the authority to order the immediate freezing of funds or assets of individuals or legal entities included in:

(a) Security Council lists drawn up pursuant to resolutions on terrorism and terrorist financing;

(b) Security Council lists drawn up pursuant to resolutions on the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Action taken

In response to a formal request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27 February 2017, the Financial Intelligence Unit asked all entities of the Peruvian financial system to provide information on accounts held by the individuals listed in annex I to Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) or by the entities listed in annex II to that resolution.

In April 2017, the Financial Intelligence Unit reported that the Peruvian financial system had no record of any accounts in the name of those subject to sanctions.

Travel-ban measures

In response to a formal request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 6 April 2017 the National Migration Authority reported that, as required by the

Security Council, all the individuals listed in annex I to resolution 2321 (2016) had been incorporated into the national migration alert system.

In addition, Peru requires all citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to have an appropriate visa to enter the country. As visas are granted by the consular offices of Peru abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated the list of individuals contained in annex I to Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) to those offices, with instructions not to issue any visas to those individuals. It also requested that the Ministry be informed of all visa applications submitted by citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with a view to carrying out more extensive checks on those applications.

Reducing the number of staff at diplomatic missions

In strict compliance with the provisions of paragraph 14 of resolution 2321 (2016), on 2 April 2017 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a formal note to the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Lima, informing him of the sovereign decision of the Government of Peru to reduce the number of diplomatic staff authorized to carry out duties at that diplomatic mission from six to a maximum of three, and giving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 90 days from the date of receipt to comply with the request.

On 17 May 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reminded the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Lima of the decision taken by the Government and highlighted the importance of meeting the deadline, given that non-compliance could lead to an irregular immigration status for some of the diplomatic officials currently working in the mission.

Restricting the entry of staff into the national territory

The Government of Peru took the sovereign decision not to grant three temporary diplomatic visas requested by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in May 2017.

While it cannot be stated with certainty that the applicants were connected to the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, this decision was taken as an effective means of reducing the number of officials at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Lima and thus implementing paragraph 15 of resolution 2321 (2016).

Limiting the number of bank accounts held by diplomatic missions

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016), in March 2017 the Ministry sent the Financial Intelligence Unit a list of the diplomatic officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accredited in Peru in order to check the number of bank accounts held by them in the Peruvian financial system.

In April 2017, the Financial Intelligence Unit notified the 247 entities of the Peruvian financial system (banks, financial institutions, savings and loan associations and cooperatives) of the action required by the Security Council and requested information on any bank accounts held by accredited officials at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and/or its consular section. As at May 2017, only one bank account has been reported in the name of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Ban regarding coal, minerals and other items

The National Customs and Tax Authority has brought to the attention of its operational and customs control units the ban on exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of coal, minerals and the items contained in resolution 2321 (2016). It has been reported that to date no attempts have been made to export the prohibited materials.

In addition, the Authority has stated that, should an attempt to export be detected, it will act in accordance with Peruvian legal provisions, that is, it will seize the prohibited goods and, if appropriate, dispose of them.

Conclusion

Peru, an elected member of the Security Council (2018-2019) and a country committed to international peace and security, has taken concrete steps to implement effectively the sanctions imposed by the Council.

United Nations S/AC.49/2017/77

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 June 2017

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 28 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to transmit the report of Malta on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex).

17-10857 (E) 070717

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Annex to the note verbale dated 28 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Malta on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016)

As a European Union member State, Malta has implemented the restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea imposed by the Security Council in resolution 2321 (2016) following its transposition by the European Union, through:

(a) Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2217 of 8 December 2016 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 designating additional persons and entities under the travel ban and asset freeze;

(b) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2215 of 8 December 2016 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 designating additional persons and entities under the travel ban and asset freeze;

(c) Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 of 27 February 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 implementing all the measures contained in resolution 2321 (2016);

(d) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/330 of 27 February 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007, which gives effect to the measures provided in Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 of 27 February 2017.

These measures provide for the following:

(a) Trade ban on the nuclear- and missile-usable items listed in annex III to resolution 2321 (2016);

(b) Trade ban on items contained in a new conventional arms dual-use list adopted by the Sanctions Committee, pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2321 (2016);

(c) Ban on the leasing or chartering of vessels or aircraft, and on providing crew services, to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(d) Prohibition on registering vessels in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the flag of that country and owning, leasing, operating, providing vessel classification, certification or associated services to, or insuring a vessel flagged by, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(e) Clarification that specialized teaching and training that could contribute to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or that country's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to, advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering;

(f) Suspension of scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups that are officially sponsored by or that represent the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, except in the case of medical exchanges. Exemptions may be granted by the Sanctions Committee in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods when it has determined, on a case-by-case basis,

that the activity will not contribute to illegal activities; for other fields of technical cooperation, the Member State may determine that the activity will not contribute to illegal activities, in which case it must notify the Sanctions Committee in advance;

(g) Attribution to the Sanctions Committee of the power to list vessels if it has information or reasonable grounds to believe that the vessels are involved in illegal activities; including additional measures that might be imposed by the Sanctions Committee;

(h) Restriction on the entry into or transit through the territory of Member States of members of the Government and officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and members of that country's armed forces who are linked to illicit activities;

(i) Limitation on the number of accounts at banks in the European Union to one per diplomatic mission and consular post of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and one per accredited diplomat and consular officer of that country;

(j) Prohibition against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea using real property that it owns or leases for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities, and against leasing from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea real property situated outside its territory;

(k) Prohibition on providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled or operated, including through illicit means, by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(l) Prohibition on procuring vessel and aircraft crewing services from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(m) Obligation to deregister any vessel that is owned, controlled or operated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including a prohibition on registering any such vessel that has been deregistered by another Member State;

(n) Extension of export prohibitions: the establishment of a new regime for the export ban on coal, including a cap on the exemptions relating to total exports to all Member States, with the power to determine the cap attributed to the Sanctions Committee and the export ban extended to new items, namely, statues, new helicopters and vessels, copper, nickel, silver and zinc;

(o) In the financial sector: imposition of an obligation to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea within 90 days, unless approved by the Sanctions Committee on the grounds that the accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions;

(p) Prohibition on providing public and private financial support, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to nationals or entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea involved in such trade;

(q) Obligation to expel persons who are working on behalf of or at the direction of a bank or financial institution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, unless the presence of the person is required for the fulfilment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or humanitarian purposes;

(r) Obligation to seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage or transfer to a State other than the originating or destination State for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016) and that are identified through inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with the

obligations of Member States under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004);

(s) The Sanctions Committee may grant exemptions to the aforementioned prohibitions, on a case-by-case basis, including when it has determined that an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of international and non-governmental organizations.

Such European Union legal instruments, once adopted, are directly applicable in Malta's national context. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2215 of 8 December 2016 and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/330 of 27 February 2017 are implemented entirely through the Enforcement of European Union Sanctions (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations, Subsidiary Legislation 365.72, which establishes penalties for any breach of applicable sanctions. Implementing national authorities were also informed of these additional measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and are regularly informed of any updates or amendments thereto.

The Malta Financial Services Authority regularly issues circulars to the compliance officers of all financial services licence holders to bring to their attention the issue of sanctions regulations issued by the United Nations, including those in respect of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Security Council resolutions are also uploaded to the Authority website. Licence holders are requested to report any action taken, including the freezing of assets under such requirements. So far, the Authority has not received any information from local financial institutions that any particular action has been needed in relation to sanctions measures regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. No financial guarantees have ever been issued in favour of individuals or entities from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

With regard to export control, no authorization of any controlled item has ever been issued by the Department of Trade of Malta with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being the ultimate beneficiary.

Moreover, all listed persons are entered in the national stop list according to the respective sanctions list, either to be refused entry when there is a travel ban or to be subject to discreet surveillance when financial/economic sanctions are in place.

Malta has had no cases involving the procuring of vessels from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and none involving vessels that are owned, controlled or operated by that country or that were deregistered by another Member State and were previously owned by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Moreover, that country does not own immovable property in Malta. Searches conducted at the public registry indicate that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has never owned or possessed any immovable property in Malta, nor does it hold any hypothecary rights in security of any credit owed by third parties.

United Nations S/AC.49/2017/78

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2017

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Kingdom of Bahrain on its implementation of resolution 2321 (2016) (see annex).

17-11364 (E) 110717 120717

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Annex to the note verbale dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Bahrain to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

[Original: Arabic]

Report of Bahrain on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016)

With regard to paragraph 36 of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016), the Kingdom of Bahrain reiterates that it was notified of the resolution and that it has informed all relevant Government ministries and agencies of the resolution's provisions, so that they might take the required measures. They have, in fact, taken several measures, including, inter alia:

- All the Kingdom's ports (land, sea and air) were instructed to scrutinize all shipments passing through Bahraini territory that come from or are destined for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or to otherwise scrutinize any suspicious shipments.
- All the Kingdom's ports (land, sea and air) were instructed to prevent the persons whose names appear in the list annexed to the resolution from travelling.
- All banks and licensed financial institutions were instructed to take the measures required to implement the provisions of the resolution.

United Nations S/AC.49/2017/79

Security Council

Distr.: General
10 July 2017

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Letter dated 7 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Latvia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

I have the honour to submit to you in your capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) the report of Latvia on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016), as prepared by the competent national institutions in Latvia (see annex).

(*Signed*) Jānis **Mažeiks**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-11751 (E) 260717

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Annex to the letter dated 7 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Latvia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Latvia on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016)

Latvia and other States members of the European Union have jointly implemented the restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea imposed by the Security Council in resolution 2321 (2016) by taking the following common measures:[1]

(a) Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2217 of 8 December 2016 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,[2] which implements the designation of additional persons and entities (travel ban and asset freeze);

(b) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2215 of 8 December 2016 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;[3]

(c) Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 of 27 February 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.[4]

Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 sets out the commitment of the European Union to the implementation of all the measures contained in resolution 2321 (2016) and provides the basis for specific accompanying measures taken by the European Union within the scope of the resolution, notably the following:

(a) Trade ban on the nuclear- and/or missile-usable items as listed in annex III to resolution 2321 (2016);

(b) Trade ban on items contained in the conventional arms dual-use list adopted by the sanctions committee pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2321 (2016);

(c) Ban on all leasing or chartering of vessels or aircraft, and on the provision of crew services, to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(d) Prohibition on registering vessels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, using that country's flag and owning, leasing, operating, providing vessel classification, certification or associated services to, or insuring a vessel flagged by, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(e) Clarification that specialized teaching and training that could contribute to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or to that country's development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to, advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering;

(f) Suspension of scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups that are officially sponsored by or that represent the Democratic People's

[1] All common measures are published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.
[2] *Official Journal of the European Union L 334*, 9 December 2016, p. 35.
[3] Ibid., 9 December 2016, p. 29.
[4] *Official Journal of the European Union L 50*, 28 February 2017, p. 59.

originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited under Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016) and that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with the obligations of Member States under applicable Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004);

(s) The sanctions committee may grant exemptions to the aforementioned prohibitions on a case-by-case basis, including when it has determined that an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of international and non-governmental organizations;

(t) Council Regulation (EU) No. 2017/330 of 27 February 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007, which concerns restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,[5] gives effect to the measures provided in Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/345 of 27 February 2017.[6]

The above-mentioned Council regulations are binding in their entirety and directly applicable to all States members of the European Union.[7]

At the national level, the following texts provide the legal basis for the implementation of sanctions in Latvia:

(a) Law on International Sanctions and National Sanctions of the Republic of Latvia of 4 February 2016;

(b) Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 468 of 15 July 2016 on procedures for the execution of international and national sanctions.

With regard to violations of sanctions regimes, Council Regulation (EU) No. 329/2007 of 27 March 2007 requires member States to determine the penalties applicable to infringements of their provisions. The penalties determined by Latvia are set out in the Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia of 17 June 1998. Article 84 of the Criminal Law provides for punishment for violations of the sanctions regimes established by international organizations. For example, for the intentional violation of the laws and regulations governing the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the European Union and other international organizations, the applicable punishment is the deprivation of liberty for a period of up to four years, the temporary deprivation of liberty, community service or a fine. Furthermore, for the same acts, if committed by a group of persons according to a prior agreement, or committed by a public official, the applicable punishment is the deprivation of liberty for a period of up to eight years.

In respect of arms embargoes, Latvia has the following national legislation requiring an export authorization for the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel to third countries and an authorization for the provision of brokering services and other services related to military activities, which, together with Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of 27 May 2016,[8] provides the basis for the enforcement of the arms embargo against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the ban on related brokering services:

(a) Law on the Circulation of Goods of Strategic Significance of 21 June 2007;

[5] Ibid., p. 1.
[6] Ibid., p. 59.
[7] Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 does not apply to Ireland or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
[8] *Official Journal of the European Union L 141*, 28 May 2016, p. 79.

(b) Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 657 of 20 July 2010 on the procedures for issuing or refusing to issue strategic goods licences and other documents relating to the circulation of strategic goods;

(c) Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 645 of 25 September 2007 on the regulation on the National List of Goods and Services;

(d) Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 331 of 8 May 2012 on the procedures for the issuance of a special permit (licence) for commercial activities with the goods referred to in the Common Military List of the European Union.

In accordance with the Law on the Circulation of Goods of Strategic Significance, the Committee for the Control of Goods of Strategic Significance, a national institution of Latvia, has been established. The Committee is entitled to cancel licences already issued and, thereafter, to not issue licences or international import certificates to entities for the circulation of goods of strategic significance.

With regard to financial restrictions, on 17 July 2008, Latvia adopted a law on the prevention of money-laundering and terrorism financing. The law establishes the Control Service, a State authority that exercises control over unusual and suspicious financial transactions and acquires, analyses and provides information to pretrial investigative institutions, the Prosecutor's Office and the courts. In addition, in accordance with the Law on International Sanctions and National Sanctions of the Republic of Latvia of 4 February 2016, the Financial and Capital Market Commission supervises the implementation of restrictions provided for in international or national sanctions regimes in relation to participants in the financial and capital market, including Latvian banks, credit unions, insurance companies and insurance brokerage companies, and participants in the financial instruments market and in private pension funds, payment institutions and electronic money institutions. The Commission is entitled to take the decisions necessary for the execution of sanctions, including decisions binding on the participants in the financial and capital market, regarding the freezing of financial resources. The Commission recently identified three Latvian banks that had not complied with the provisions of the regulatory framework regarding efforts to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. The Commission conducted targeted inspections and carried out planned on-site inspections. It concluded that, on several occasions, several customers of those banks, making use of offshore companies and complicated chain transactions, had transferred the funds from their bank accounts to circumvent international sanctions requirements imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Consequently, monetary fines were applied to the banks and an agreement was reached to improve the related internal control systems of the banks and to strengthen their effectiveness by enhancing information technology solutions and ensuring external testing.

With regard to restrictions on providing public financial support for trade with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that could contribute to that country's weapons of mass destruction programmes, the issuance of export credit guarantees in Latvia is governed by Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 866 of 20 December 2016, on the regulation of short-term export credit guarantees for entrepreneurs and relevant agricultural services cooperative societies, and administrated by Altum. Altum is a State-owned development finance institution that offers State aid to target groups with the help of financial tools, such as credit guarantees. Altum is duly informed about the restrictive measures in force and takes the relevant provisions, including those concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, into due account when decisions on financial support for trade are taken.

In respect of restrictions on admission (visa ban), Latvia has the following national legislation, which, together with Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of

27 May 2016 and Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, provides the basis for the refusal of admission and the denial of requests for a visa:

(a) Immigration Law of 31 October 2002;

(b) Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 122 of 5 March 2013 on regulations regarding the register of returned foreigners and entry bans;

(c) Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 676 of 30 August 2011 on visa regulations.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
11 July 2017

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 10 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to transmit, pursuant to the letter dated 15 June 2017 from the Panel of Experts, the report of the Republic of Slovenia on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017) (see annex).

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Annex to the note verbale dated 10 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Slovenia on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017)

1. Slovenia and the other States members of the European Union have jointly implemented the restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea imposed by Security Council resolutions 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), by way of the following measures:

- Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 of 27 May 2016 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and repealing Decision 2013/183/CFSP, as amended most recently by Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/994 of 12 June 2017. European Union member States must ensure that their national policies conform to such decisions.

- Council Regulation (EC) No. 329/2007 of 27 March 2007 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as amended most recently by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/993 of 12 June 2017. Regulations of the Council of the European Union are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in Slovenia.

2. Slovenia implements the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions and European Union legal acts, within its competence in relation to the European Union, as well as through its relevant national legislation. To that effect, it has adopted several implementation measures with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the basis of the act regulating restrictive measures introduced or implemented in accordance with legal instruments and decisions adopted by international organizations (statutory instrument No. 127/2006 of the Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia), currently consolidated in the decree on restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on the implementation of European Union regulations relating to these restrictive measures (statutory instrument No. 18/2017 of the Official Journal). Certain general legal acts also apply in relation to those restrictive measures, such as the Criminal Code, the Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences Act, the Foreigners Act, the Defence Act, the Firearms Act and the Act Regulating the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2017

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 11 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations has the honour to submit the following information on the national measures taken with a view to implementing Security Council resolution 2321 (2016), in accordance with paragraph 36 of that resolution.

The State of Israel appreciates the Security Council's efforts to maintain international peace and security, in accordance with the authority granted to it in the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions.

The State of Israel is deeply concerned by the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, particularly by the country's repeated violations of relevant Security Council resolutions. The State of Israel joins the Security Council's calls to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with those resolutions, and considers resolution 2321 (2016) a measure to strengthen the sanctions regime established to ensure that the country complies with its international obligations.

In this regard, the State of Israel is committed to the continuous support for and cooperation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and avails itself to continue assisting the Committee and the Panel of Experts.

The State of Israel is conducting an ongoing observation process to improve its implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016). Through regular inter-agency assessments led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government of Israel aims to implement Security Council sanctions resolutions to the fullest extent. Following the adoption of resolution 2321 (2016), the State of Israel also issued an update to strengthen its existing travel warning for Israeli citizens to refrain from visiting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, owing to the prevailing situation in the country. The travel warning was also revised to reference relevant Security Council resolutions.

Israel has also initiated an internal process meant to expand the legal basis upon which to implement Security Council resolution 2321 (2016). Once complete, this internal process will join the State of Israel's existing legal framework and

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procedures regarding the implementation of resolution 2321 (2016), including the Import and Export Order (Control of Goods Exported to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), 5776-2015, detailed in our previous note verbale (S/AC.49/2016/74).

The State of Israel wishes to reiterate its commitment to cooperate with the Security Council and its Committee.

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Security Council

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13 July 2017

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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 13 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to transmit herewith the national implementation report of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on Security Council resolution 2321 (2016), in accordance with paragraph 36 of the resolution (see annex).

The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is committed to continuing to implement Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) and other related Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

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Annex to the note verbale dated 13 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Ethiopia on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016)

The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia continues to implement the sanctions and restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea imposed by the Security Council through resolution 2321 (2016).

Ethiopia has no scientific or technical cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It has no cooperation or interaction involving persons or groups that are under the Security Council sanctions list, except for a diplomatic mission in Ethiopia. In accordance with Council resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has taken the following measures:

(a) It has informed the relevant ministries, including the National Intelligence and Security Service, and Ethiopian Airlines, through a circular, of the individuals under the Security Council sanctions;

(b) It has imposed a restriction on entry into or transit through Ethiopia of members of the Government and officials of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and members of that country's armed forces associated with nuclear and ballistic missile programmes;

(c) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is currently working in coordination with the National Bank of Ethiopia to take measures to limit the number of bank accounts of the embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its diplomats and consular officers to one account.

United Nations S/AC.49/2017/83

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 July 2017

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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 18 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and has the honour to transmit the national implementation report of the Republic of Armenia pursuant to Security Council resolution 2321 (2016) (see annex).

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Annex to the note verbale dated 18 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Measures contained in Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016) relevant to Member States' national implementation reports: report of Armenia

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes/No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
1. **Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to DPRK of:** (*Fact Sheet sections I to IV, X, XIII and XIV*)	No			
(a) **All arms and related materiel?**				
(b) **Nuclear, ballistic missile or other WMD-related items or technology?**[a]				
(c) **Luxury goods?**[b]				
(d) **Any item** that could contribute to prohibited programmes or activities or evasion of sanctions?				
(e) **Prohibited items** for repair, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing, regardless of whether ownership or control is transferred?				
(f) **New helicopters and vessels?**				
(g) **Aviation fuel**, including **aviation gasoline, naphtha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and kerosene-type rocket fuel** (unless the Committee approves in advance on an exceptional case-by-case basis the transfer to the DPRK of such products for verified essential humanitarian needs, subject to arrangement for effective monitoring of delivery and use)?				

[a] The lists of prohibited nuclear-, ballistic missile- and other WMD-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, as well as luxury goods, are available on the website of the Committee, https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials.

[b] See above.

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
These measures **shall not apply** with respect to the sale or supply of aviation fuel to civilian passenger aircraft outside the DPRK exclusively for consumption during its flight to the DPRK and its return flight. States are called upon to exercise vigilance to ensure that **no more fuel** is provided to DPRK-flagged civil passenger aircraft than is necessary for the relevant flight, including a standard margin for safety of flight.				
2. **Prohibit the procurement from the DPRK of:** (*Fact Sheet sections I to IV, and XI to XII*)	No			
(a) **All arms and related materiel?**				
(b) **Nuclear, ballistic missile or other WMD-related items or technology?**				
(c) **Any item** that could contribute to prohibited programmes or activities or evasion of sanctions?				
(d) **Prohibited items** for repair, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing, regardless of whether ownership or control is transferred?				
(e) **Coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals?**				
(f) **Copper, nickel, silver and zinc?**				
(g) **Statues** (unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance)?				
These measures shall not apply with respect to:				
(a) **Coal** that the procuring State confirms on the basis of credible information has **originated outside the DPRK** and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), provided that the State				

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes*	*No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
notifies the Committee in advance, and such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the resolutions;					
(b) Total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 53,495,894 US dollars or 1,000,866 metric tons, whichever is lower, between the date of adoption of resolution 2321 (2016) (30 November 2016) and 31 December 2016, and total exports to all Member States of coal originating in the DPRK that in the aggregate do not exceed 400,870,018 US dollars or 7,500,000 metric tons per year, whichever is lower, beginning 1 January 2017, provided that the procurements:					
(i) involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the resolutions, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions; and					
(ii) are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the resolutions, and decides that each Member State that procures coal from the DPRK shall notify the Committee of the aggregate amount of the volume of					

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
such procurement for each month no later than 30 days after the conclusion of that month on the form in annex V to resolution 2321 (2016);				
(c) Transactions in **iron** and **iron ore** that are determined to be exclusively for livelihood purposes and unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the resolutions.				
3. **Prevent the transfer from or to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of financial transactions, technical training, advice, services and assistance related to:** (a) **All arms and related materiel?** (b) **Nuclear, ballistic missile or other WMD-related items or technology?** (c) **Any item** that could contribute to prohibited programmes or activities or evasion of sanctions? (d) **Engagement in the hosting** of trainers, advisers, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training?	Yes (Central Bank)	1. According to article 10 (18) of the Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Law of the Republic of Armenia, the Financial Monitoring Centre of the Central Bank of Armenia is entitled to publish the lists of non-compliant countries or territories, based on data publicized by international structures. 2. According to the order of the Head of the Financial Monitoring Centre, lists published by international structures shall be monitored and the amendments published on a daily basis.	1. The Financial Monitoring Centre of the Central Bank of Armenia notifies reporting entities about the requirements to freeze funds in the cases described in Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016) and provides the financial institutions with the list of designated persons and entities. 2. The Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), in its fifth Round of Mutual Evaluation of anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing measures of the Republic of Armenia,[c] summarized the AML/CFT measures that are in place in Armenia with respect to the level of technical compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)	

[c] http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round5/MONEYVAL(2015)34_5thR_MER_Armenia.pdf.

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
			under Recommendation 7 and the level of effectiveness under Immediate Outcome 11. As a result, it was noted that the Republic of Armenia is partially compliant with Recommendation 7 and has achieved a substantial level of effectiveness for Immediate Outcome 11.	
4. **Prohibit the transfer of any items** if a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item's transfer: **in accordance with its national legal procedures, freeze funds, other financial assets and economic resources** owned or controlled by, and ensure that none are made available to benefit designated individuals or entities, entities of the Government of the DPRK or the Worker's Party of Korea, those acting on their behalf or at their direction and entities owned or controlled by them?	Yes (Central Bank)	1. The mechanism for freezing assets, including funds, other assets and economic resources of individuals or entities designated under United Nations sanctions resolutions is set out under article 28 of the AML/CFT Law. 2. According to article 30 of the AML/CFT Law, non-compliance or inadequate compliance with the requirements of the Law (including freezing requirements) or the legal statutes adopted on the basis thereof by financial institutions shall result in responsibility measures, as established by the legislation regulating their activities, in the manner provided for under such legislation.	The Financial Monitoring Centre of the Central Bank of Armenia notifies reporting entities about the requirements to freeze funds in the cases described in Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016) and provides the financial institutions with the list of designated persons and entities.	
5. **Prevent (restrict) entry or transit of designated individuals** together with their family members; of **any individual acting on behalf or at the direction of** a designated individual or entity or **violating the sanctions or assisting in their evasion; of members of the Government of the DPRK, officials of that Government, and members of the DPRK armed forces** if the State determines that such members or officials are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or				

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by resolutions? The travel ban **does not apply** to such individuals and entities when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or the Committee concludes that an exemption would further the objectives of the resolutions. States can submit requests for exemptions from the travel ban for designated individuals and entities following the instructions set out in the Committee Guidelines. **Expel** such an individual for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK or to the individual's state of nationality consistent with applicable national and international law, provided that these measures shall not impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters or other United Nations facilities to conduct United Nations business. These measures shall not apply with respect to a particular individual if: • The presence of the individual is required for fulfilment of judicial process; • The presence of the individual is required exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes; or • The Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of the resolutions. (*Fact Sheet section V and VIII*)				
6. **Financial measures:** (a) **Prevent provision of financial services, or transfer of any financial or other assets or**	Yes (Central Bank)	1. According to chapter 2.1 of decision 386-N of 29 July 2005 of the Board of the Central Bank of the	1. The Financial Monitoring Centre of the Central Bank of Armenia notifies reporting entities	

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes*	*No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
resources, including bulk cash and gold and through cash and gold couriers, which could contribute to the DPRK's prohibited programmes or activities, or to the evasion of sanctions, and exercise enhanced vigilance in this regard?			Republic of Armenia: "In case of a lump sum import or export of currency (except for coins made of precious metals) and treasury bills (hereinafter referred to as monetary instruments), as well as traveller's checks in excess of the total amount of US$ 10 thousand through the customs border of the Customs Union, natural persons shall be obliged to declare in writing the full amount of the monetary instruments and (or) traveller's checks before producing them for customs control, by means of filing a passenger customs declaration."	about the requirements to freeze funds in the cases described in Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 (2016) and provides the financial institutions with the list of designated persons and entities.	
(b) **Prohibit DPRK banks** from opening and operation of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices; establishing new joint ventures; or taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in a State's jurisdiction or within its territory, **unless such transactions have been approved by the Committee in advance?**			2. According to article 156.1 of the Customs Code "Customs authorities shall suspend transportation of currency and (or) bearer securities based on information received for anti-money-laundering or counter-terrorism financing purposes from the Authorized Body as defined under the Republic of Armenia Law on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing or from law enforcement agencies, in accordance with legislation or with international treaties of the Republic of Armenia, and shall draw up a report in two copies in the manner prescribed by legislation or by international treaties of the Republic of Armenia. One copy of the report shall be provided to the person transporting currency	(2) By Presidential Ordinance an Interagency Committee on Combating Counterfeit Money, Fraud with Plastic Cards and Other Payment Instruments, Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in the Republic of Armenia was established on 21 March 2002 and renamed as Republic of Armenia Interagency Committee on Combating Money Laundering, Terrorism Financing and Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The inter-agency Committee's objectives are:	
(c) **Prohibit financial institutions** from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK?				(a) Coordinating actions aimed at the identification and assessment of money-laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing risks in Armenia, as well as ensuring that the findings of such assessments are up to date;	
(d) **Prohibit States from having** representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK, if the State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to the prohibited programmes or activities, **unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis** that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations, or for any other purposes consistent with the resolutions?				(b) Developing a unified state policy that reflects the findings of the assessment of	
(e) **No provision of public and private financial support** from within their territories or by					

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	Yes	No	Indicate measures (in detail)	Additional information	Remarks
persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the resolutions?			and (or) bearer securities, and the other copy shall be maintained by the customs authority. Immediately upon suspending transportation of currency and (or) bearer securities, customs authorities shall promptly notify the Authorized Body or the law enforcement agency specified under clause 1 of the article, which had submitted the relevant information. 3. According to point 7 of article 13 of the AML/CFT Law, "Within 3 business days after being notified that the customs authority suspended transportation of currency and (or) bearer securities through the customs border, the Authorized Body shall be obligated to advise the customs authority on lifting the suspension, or to submit a notification to law enforcement agencies. In case of submitting a notification, the Authorized Body shall provide information substantiating the potential link between the suspended currency and (or) bearer securities and money-laundering or terrorism financing. The Authorized Body shall without delay advise the customs authority on submitting the notification." Additionally, according to point 1 of article 28 of the AML/CFT Law, "The property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by terrorism-related persons included in the lists	money-laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing risks in Armenia; (c) Coordinating domestic and international cooperation in the field of combating money-laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing; (d) Implementing other objectives that are aimed at the enhancement of the effective system in Armenia for combating money-laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing and do not contradict the provisions of Presidential Ordinance No. NK-1075 "On Establishment of a Committee" of 21 March 2002.	

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	Yes No	Indicate measures (in detail)	Additional information	Remarks
		published by or in accordance with the Security Council resolutions, as well as in the lists specified under part 2 of this article shall be subject to freezing by customs authorities and reporting entities without delay and without prior notice to the persons involved. The state bodies or persons which have legally defined powers to restrict (arrest, block, freeze, suspend) the possession, use and (or) disposal of the property stipulated in this part shall exercise their power in the manner established by the law whenever they disclose such property."		
		4. The procedure of licensing for banking activity, including registration of branches and representative offices of foreign banks, is regulated by the Republic of Armenia Law on Banks and Banking, as well as by Regulation 1 on Procedures for Licensing, Registration, Giving Consent and Permission, Appraisal of Professional Adequacy and Qualification in the Area of Activity of Banks. Articles 27 and 28 of the Law on Banks and Banking specify, inter alia, the documents necessary to submit for the registration of a branch or a representative office of a foreign bank, the registration procedure as well as grounds for waiving applications for registration. Pursuant to Regulation 1, for the		

prior approval of the issuance of the banking licence, documents to be submitted to the Central Bank by a branch of a foreign bank include a statement that the home country of the foreign bank is considered to be a cooperative country in terms of combating money-laundering and terrorism financing, and that no statement has been published for the given country by FATF and/or other relevant international body about the non-compliance of the AML/CFT system of the country.

5. The definition of freezing, as stated in clause 37, part 1, article 3 of the AML/CFT Law, includes, inter alia, prohibition on the establishment of any business relationship (including provision of financial services) or conduct of occasional transactions with designated persons and entities. Accordingly, reporting entities are prohibited from establishing financial relationships with the DPRK banks and making funds or other assets available to or for the benefit of designated entities.

7. **Prevent new commitments for grants, financial assistance or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for** humanitarian and developmental purposes, or the promotion of denuclearization?

(*Fact sheet section IX (d)*) –

8. **Inspect in the State's territory, including in its airports, seaports and free trade zones, the cargo to or from the DPRK**, or brokered or facilitated by No

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*

the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, or transported on DPRK-flagged vessel or aircraft?

(*Fact Sheet section XIV*)

(a) **Under certain conditions and with certain exceptions, inspect vessels on the high seas and prohibit the provision of bunkering services to DPRK vessels** if the State has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe their cargo contains prohibited items?

(b) **Prohibit their nationals and those in their territories from leasing or chartering their flagged vessels or aircraft or providing crew services to the DPRK?**

This measure shall apply without exception, **unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance.**

(c) **Prohibit their nationals from procuring vessel and aircraft crewing services from the DPRK?**

(d) **Prohibit** their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction **from registering vessels in the DPRK**, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and from owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK?

This measure shall apply without exception, **unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis** accompanied in advance.

(e) **Prohibit** their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes*	*No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*

their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated, including through illicit means, by the DPRK?

This measure shall apply without exception, **unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis** that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes.

(f) De-register any vessel that is owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK, and shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 2321 (2016)?

(g) **Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly Member States' territory unless** under the condition of landing for inspection, if the State has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains prohibited items, except in the case of an emergency landing?

(h) **Prohibit the entry into their ports of any vessel** if the State has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated individual or entity, or contains cargo the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by the resolutions, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or for inspection, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the

Have concrete measures, procedures, legislation, regulations or policies been adopted in order to	*Yes/No*	*Indicate measures (in detail)*	*Additional information*	*Remarks*
objectives of resolution 2270 (2016)?				
9. **Under certain conditions, seize and dispose of prohibited items** found during an inspection? (*Fact Sheet section XV*)	n/a			
10. **Prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals** within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's prohibited programmes or activities?	—			
Suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges **unless**: (a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, **the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis** that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes; or (b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes and **notifies the Committee in advance** of such determination. (*Fact Sheet section VI*)				

United Nations S/AC.49/2017/84

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 July 2017
English
Original: Russian

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Note verbale dated 19 July 2017 from the Permanent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and, with reference to Security Council resolutions 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), has the honour to inform him that the provisions of these resolutions have been brought to the attention of the relevant institutions in the Kyrgyz Republic. All relevant ministries and departments in the Kyrgyz Republic are now guided in their work by the provisions of the aforementioned resolutions.

The Kyrgyz Republic is committed to complying with international instruments and principles relating to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

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United Nations S/AC.49/2017/85

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 July 2017
English
Original: Arabic

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Letter dated 14 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Oman to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

I am pleased to transmit herewith the report of the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the steps it has taken to implement Security Council resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016) on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see annex), in compliance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).

(*Signed*) Khalifa Ali Issa **Al Harthy**
Permanent Representative

17-12364 (E) 270717 310717

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Annex to the letter dated 14 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Oman to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Report of Oman on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016)

With regard to the implementation of the measures set out in Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013) on sanctions imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as the two resolutions on the matter that were most recently adopted by the Council, namely resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), we wish to affirm that the Sultanate of Oman is carrying out its responsibilities under the relevant Security Council resolutions with utmost seriousness. The Omani authorities are closely monitoring all activities in order to maintain international peace and security.

Accordingly, Oman has formed a working group whose main task is to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016), as well as the resolutions mentioned above.

The competent authorities in Oman, acting through committees and working groups in which the relevant authorities in the Sultanate are represented, implement Security Council resolutions without delay.

With respect to resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that have been adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 41, of the Charter of the United Nations, Oman supports global efforts aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and maintaining international peace and security, and is committed to implementing the relevant international resolutions. It recognizes that it is important for all the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil their obligations pursuant to the Treaty, and reaffirms that further steps must be taken to promote international nuclear disarmament efforts. It should be noted that no Omani Government institutions have dealings or contracts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Measures taken

The Sultanate of Oman circulated Security Council resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016) to Government agencies and instructed the competent authorities to take appropriate measures to implement those resolutions. Those authorities have also been instructed to take, within their respective areas of competence, technical and administrative measures that are in keeping with national legislation and in line with the measures that were taken with respect to previous resolutions.

Key measures

1. Nuclear activities

The resolution prohibits the specialized teaching or training of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in fields related to nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. Oman has not carried out any activities in that regard, and became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons pursuant to Royal Decree No. 91/96 dated 22 July 1996. It deposited its instrument of accession with the depositary, the Government of the United States of America, on 23 January 1997. On 28 June 2001, Oman also signed an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply safeguards in accordance with article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On 6 November 2003, it

signed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which concerns nuclear safety, environmental harm and the legal dimensions of nuclear proliferation.

2. Inspection and monitoring

Oman has enacted many laws that place new restrictions on the import and export of traditional military materials and associated support and training services. It has also taken greater care to ensure that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not acquire materials that are used in its banned weapons programmes. Oman has imposed new restrictions on exported goods, introduced an effective inspection system for shipments destined for and coming from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and banned delivery of aircraft fuel to that country. Oman has circulated the resolutions to the relevant authorities so that each may carry out the necessary procedures within its purview. Oman emphasizes that it has no arms deals, contracts or agreements with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and it has informed all Omani ports and shipping companies of the need to comply with the relevant international resolutions.

3. Assets, funds and travel ban

The resolution provides for an asset freeze that applies to all funds and other financial assets and economic resources outside of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by that State. It imposes a travel ban on individuals and lists vessels and companies that are subject to the asset freeze. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has circulated the list of banned individuals to Omani missions abroad because they contain the names of certain ambassadors and diplomats from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and it has notified the aforementioned agencies. Oman has enacted a law on combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, which was promulgated by Royal Decree No. 30 (2016).

The Sultanate of Oman has not received any reports of situations or cases that are within the scope of the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since the adoption of Security Council resolution 2270 (2016) on 2 March 2016, with the exception of one case, in which the necessary measures were taken. The details of that case are set out below.

The following situation was brought to the attention of the Sultanate of Oman before the adoption of Security Council resolution 2321 (2016).

The Permanent Mission of the Sultanate of Oman to the United Nations in New York received a memorandum from the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) dated 29 August 2016 asking the Government to provide information regarding a citizen of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea named Ri Won Ho.

The relevant authorities were asked to provide the requested information. After investigation, the information was sent to the Permanent Mission of the Sultanate in New York in a communication from the Ministry dated 6 February 2017 and passed on to the Panel of Experts. It was explained that the individual in question works as a diplomat at the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Cairo and entered Oman on official visits in the company of the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Cairo. The relevant Omani authorities stated that the aforementioned individual had not been flagged by security officials, nor was he subject to any security restrictions. There were no suspicious bank accounts or financial transfers in his name.

After Ri Won Ho appeared on the list of banned individuals annexed to Security Council resolution 2321 (2016), the Government took the action required and circulated that information to the Omani authorities.

In conclusion, the Sultanate of Oman reaffirms its support for all international efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and maintain global peace and security. It adheres to the relevant international resolutions, and reiterates that Omani Government institutions do not have agreements, treaties, dealings or contracts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.